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Informal relations between American merchant traders and the 
Sultanate of Oman in the port of Zanzibar began with the landing of the first 
American merchants about 1828. At the same approximate time, Sultan Said 
bin Sultan moved his official residence from Muscat, Oman, to Zanzibar, 
underlining the importance of Zanzibar to the administration of his 
territories on the East African coast. Relations were formalized by the Treaty 
of 1833 between the United States and Oman, and the U.S. established a 
consular mission in Zanzibar in 1837 and in Muscat in 1838. 
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The growth of the Omani Empire under Sultan Said expanded and 
prospered during the period examined in the present research (1828-1856). 
Oman's growth and prosperity, resulting primarily from its possession of 
Zanzibar and ports on the East African coast, roughly parallels the expansion 
and prosperity of the Zanzibar trade to American merchant traders. After 
Said's death, the Omani Empire was divided in a bitter succession battle 
(abetted by the British, who enjoyed military dominance in the region), and 
this point marked the beginning of the decline of the Oman as a regional 
economic and political power. 
The present study surveys these two parallel developments over the 
critical 28-year reign of Sultan Said. The survey finds that, as with much 
economic development in the "third world" in the nineteenth century, Oman's 
enormous growth and prosperity during this period was directly linked to the 
growth and prosperity of commercial interests of a "developed" Western 
nation (in Oman's case, the United States). The study found that political 
developments between the two countries followed, and were informed and 
directed by, commercial developments. America's first three consuls to the 
Sultanate of Oman in Zanzibar were New England merchant traders more 
focused on their own commercial interests than on political concerns. That 
both parties (American traders and the Omani government) ultimately 
prospered is testimony to the complementary nature of their respective 
economic goals and foreign policy objectives. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Diplomatic and economic relations between the United States and the 
Sultanate of Oman date to the early nineteenth century, when American 
merchants first developed an interest in the Zanzibar trade. Zanzibar, at that 
time, was part of the realm of the Sultan of Oman, as was a large portion of 
the coast of East Africa. That the early history of the development of 
diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Oman so closely parallels the 
development of economic relations goes to the heart of the findings of the 
present research effort. In fact, it was the growth of relations between Omani 
officials and American merchant traders that first necessitated the creation of 
formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. It was in the natural 
course of events, then, that America's diplomatic envoys to Oman in the 
nineteenth century were merchant traders. 
There is a long history of contact between the Arab peoples and the 
populations of Zanzibar and East Africa, with the Omanis being the major 
group of Arabs settled in the areas by the year A.D. 1000. In 1503 the 
Portuguese occupied Mombasa and other East African coastal sites as part of 
their expansionist activity in the Indian Ocean region. They occupied Muscat 
in 1508 and remained there until 1650, when the rising Yaaruba Dynasty of 
Oman ousted them. The Yaaruba carried their war against the Portuguese to 
their settlements in East Africa and the Indian Ocean. 
By 1698 the Y aaruba controlled the entire East African coast. In 17 44, 
Ahmed bin Said, a challenger of Yaarubi leadership in Oman, was elected 
Imam after successfully fighting off a Persian invasion of Oman. His 
ascendancy culminated in the founding of the Al-Busaid dynasty, which has 
continued its rule in Oman to the present day. 
After Imam Ahmed, the greatest of the early Al-Busaid rulers was 
Sayyid Said bin Sultan, who ruled Oman from 1804 to 1856 and was 
responsible for Oman's expansion and political influence through the Gulf 
region and extending over East Africa. Sayyid Said bin Sultan, ruler of 
Muscat, Zanzibar, and its dependencies in East African arrived in Zanzibar 
for the first time in 1828. At the time he was involved in civil strife with the 
Mazrui clan of Mombassa. In Zanzibar he met Captain Edmund Roberts, an 
American trader. Given his internal difficulties as well as his desire to 
expand his realm in the Gulf region, Sayyid Said seized the opportunity to 
suggest to Roberts that the Americans negotiate a commercial treaty with 
Oman. His hopes included the possibility of future American military 
assistance, although this was not to come about. Regardless, Roberts 
returned to the United States and began a lobbying effort through Senator 
Levy Woodbury, a family acquaintance, which resulted in President Jackson 
agreeing to send a special mission to Muscat, Oman and other Far Eastern 
ports to negotiate treaties for the protection of American trade in those 
regions. Furthermore, he appointed Edmund Roberts to the position of 
Special Agent with the power to negotiate on behalf of the U.S. Government 
for treaties with Muscat, Siam, and Cochin-China. 
On September 21, 1833, Roberts and Sayyid Said signed the first 
treaty ever between the United States and an Eastern Arabian state. The 
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treaty was ratified by the U.S. Congress in June, 1834, and ratified treaties 
were formally exchanged on September 30, 1835. At this point diplomatic and 
commercial relations between the United States and Oman were officially 
opened. This Treaty of 1833 became a model for later commercial treaties 
between Oman and Britain, France, and the Hanseatic cities of Germany. 
Sayyid Said soon consolidated his economic and political power in East 
Africa. In 1837 he defeated the Mazrui ofMombassa and moved his realm's 
capital from Muscat to Zanzibar, placing the heart of his commercial empire 
on the threshold of East Africa. That same year, Richard P. Waters, 
America's first Consul to the Sultanate of Oman, and the first foreign 
emissary to take up a posting in the Sultan's new capital, arrived in Zanzibar 
to establish the U.S. mission. The following year Henry Marshall took up a 
similar position in the former Omani capital of Muscat. Thus, Omani-
Americru:i relations were cemented, and trade between the two countries 
began to grow. 
Richard P. Waters was a merchant trader, and his tenure in Zanzibar 
reflected his orientation. He established cordial relations with the Sultan and 
formed an alliance with J airam Sewji, the master of the custom house in 
Zanzibar. Over the next few years Waters and Sewji formed a virtual 
monopoly over trade through Zanzibar. The arrangement was quite profitable 
for both, and Waters' trading company enjoyed a profitable inside track in the 
Zanzibar trade. The arrangement was certainly unethical, if not completely 
illegal, by todays standards of diplomatic protocol, but at that time the 
guidelines were less well defined. However, their arrangement began to falter 
after 1841, when the British, who were the dominant military power in the 
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region at the time, posted their first British Consul to Zanzibar. This was a 
man named Atkins Hamerton, and when he arrived and noted the strength of 
the economic and political influence gained by the Americans in the space of 
just a few years set himself to the task of undermining American influence 
while at the same time protecting British commercial and political interests 
and working toward suppressing the East African slave trade. Compounding 
the work of Hamerton, envoys from other European countries, most notably 
the French, also entered the market, as did competing American firms. The 
end result was that the Waters-Sewji monopoly crumbled under the weight of 
competing interests. In 1844 Waters left Zanzibar and resigned his post the 
following year. 
America's second consul to Zanzibar was Charles Ward, who arrived in 
1846. His years in Zanzibar were marked with controversies, some of them 
substantial, others quite trivial (including a heated dispute over the Sultan's 
failure to offer a formal salute to the American flag on the Fourth of July). In 
fact, Ward succeeded in undoing a great deal of the foundations that Waters 
had laid, and his tenure culminated in the breaking off of diplomatic 
relations. This damage was repaired by John Aulick, who was dispatched by 
the State Department in 1851, but a significant amount of the goodwill 
between the two countries had been damaged. Ward resigned his position in 
1852. 
The third American Consul to Zanzibar was William McMullan (1852-
1856), who succeeded in improving Omani-American relations, regaining 
much of the ground that Ward had lost. During his tenure trade between 
Oman and the United States flourished. This was a time when Sayyid Said 
5 
was once more occupied with civil difficulties over the W ahabbis in Oman and 
with a Persian threat over Bander Abbas. The period (and the scope of the 
present research) concludes with the death of Sayyid Said in 1856. 
The scope of this thesis, then, encompasses commercial and diplomatic 
contact between the Sultanate of Oman and the United States, from the time 
of the earliest, informal commercial contact, through the development of 
formal treaties, and culminating with the death of Sayyid Said and the 
subsequent breakup of the Omani Empire. The thesis will document the 
commercial origins and economic rationale for the formal diplomatic ties that 
developed between the two countries. 
Following are Figures 1, 2, and 3, which present maps of the regions 
under discussion in the present thesis 
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FitNre 2. Map of Western Indian Ocean showing primary 
settlements and topographical regions. (Source: Sheriff, Slaves. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ROBERTS MISSION, 1828-1836 
Commercial contact between America and Oman existed well before 
the Treaty of 1833, as both countries had long standing maritime traditions. 
For centuries Omani vessels had been calling at ports in East Africa, India, 
the East Indies, and in China. Although a young nation, the United States in 
the nineteenth century had a strong merchant fleet. American vessels from 
New York, Boston and Salem sailed around both Cape Horn and the Cape of 
Good Hope, touching the great ports on all the seas, including those of the 
Pacific Islands, the East Indies, China, East Africa, and most of the other 
primary global ports. Among these was Muscat, Oman. 
Records indicate that the first American vessel to visit Muscat was the 
Boston brig, Rambler, which touched port in Muscat during the presidency of 
George Washington, in 1790.l Five years later, in 1795, Charles Derby 
reached Muscat in the brig Cadet out of Salem. Derby purchased a cargo of 
coffee in what became the beginning of a lucrative trade for Salem merchants 
in Muscat. 2 American merchant traders were able to bring to the Omanis a 
wide variety of goods that were in great demand in Zanzibar and East Africa, 
among them cotton, cloth, guns and powder, household goods such as 
crockery, glassware, chairs, and domestic goods like soap, white sugar, and 
flour. Also traded were American goods that were useful in their own trade 
with the African interior, including things like beads, brass wire, and 
10 
miscellaneous kinds of hardware. Most highly valued of all, however, was 
American cotton cloth. It was during this period that the word "merikani" 
passed into the language of the region, and is used to this day to denote 
American cloth. It was far superior to British and Indian cloth and was in 
great demand, giving American traders from New England (the textile capital 
of the U.S.) a great trading advantage. 
In exchange, the Omanis traded cloves, ivory, dates, animal hides, 
palm oil, ginger, and gum-copal. The.hides were essential to an expanding 
shoe manufacturing industry in New England. Palm oil was used in the 
manufacture of soap as well as being in demand for lubricating industrial 
machinery prior to the rise of mineral oil. Gum-cop al was the base for fine 
varnishes and lacquers in the making of furniture. 
Following in Table I is a summary of American exports to Zanzibar in 
contemporary dollars. 
TABLE I 
ANNUAL AMERICAN EXPORTS TO ZANZIBAR, 
1838-1854 
Year/$ Year/$ 
1838 $96,923 1847 incomplete 
1839 113,141 1848 214,757 
1840 101,922 1849 380,000 
1841 218,712 1850 275,242 
1842 196,982 1851 unavailable 
1843 179,372 1852 471,200 
1844 incomplete 1853 375,675 
1845 240,396 1854 495,806 
1846 186,675 
Source: C.S. Nicholls, The Swahili Coast p. 332. 
11 
It can be seen that the value of American exports to Zanzibar rose 
steadily, though intermittantly, throughout the seventeen-year period. 
Although not America's leading trading partner by any means, Zanzibar still 
ranked as a significant trading partner. Comparable figures for that period of 
America's imports from other countries shows that in 1845, for example, 
America imported $1 million from Mexico, $3 million from Germany, and $7 
million from China. Total world imports in that year were $113 million. 
American trade with Omani and East African ports continued 
smoothly for a quarter century, until political unrest in the Arabian Gulf and 
the Qawasim challenge to British power in the region disrupted Muscat's 
12 
trading position.3 However, American vessels continued to visit East African 
ports, with twelve American vessels visiting East African ports in 18044, and 
trade continued growing until it was abruptly halted by President Jefferson's 
shipping embargo that was in place from 1807 to 1809. The intention of the 
embargo was to coerce British and French recognition of American rights, but 
the unintended result was to put the majority of the American merchant fleet 
out of commission. In addition, the Napoleonic War and the War of 1812 both 
inhibited American commercial shipping, resulting in serious setbacks to 
America's commercial position in the Indian Ocean. Smaller ports like Salem 
never fully recovered; for example, of Salem's two hundred registered vessels 
in 1812, only fifty-seven survived to recommence foreign trade at war's end.5 
Upon completion of the War of 1812 with the signing of the peace 
treaty in 1815, American vessels began returning to maritime activities. 
However, Salem merchants could no longer compete with New York and 
Boston for new Western markets, and contented themselves to continue trade 
with East Africa, the East Indies, Oman, and other Eastern ports. Thus, it 
was Salem merchants who eventually became the leading American traders 
with East African and Indian Ocean ports. One example is that ofN.L. Roger, 
one of the early Salem traders. He reported direct contacts with the islands of 
Mauritius and Reunion as early as 1804,6 and further claimed to have opened 
the Madagascar and Zanzibar trades.7 However, the date of the earliest visit 
of an American vessel at the port of Zanzibar is difficult to establish with 
certainty, since ship's records rarely record all ports visited on a given trading 
cruise, since ship captains and merchants were reluctant to disclose potential 
lucrative markets. However, the first recorded visit of an American trading 
13 
vessel to the port of Zanzibar was in 1826, when the brig Ann visited the 
port.8 On March 1, 1826, the brigVireinia mastered by one Captain 
Goodridge reached Zanzibar. His return trip is the first known to have sailed 
directly to Salem from Zanzibar. Captain Goodridge made the voyage in 
ninety-five days, arriving in Salem on June 18, 1826. Captain Goodridge 
noted that seven American vessels had reached port at Zanzibar.9 
ROBERTS' FIRST VOYAGE TO ZANZIBAR 
The most significant early voyage to Zanzibar from the point of view of 
Omani-American relations was that of the ship Mazy Ann, sailing from New 
Bedford, New Hampshire, with one Edmund Roberts as captain. He sailed 
with a cargo consigned to him with the hope of profitable trade in the new 
port of Zanzibar, which he'd learned of through an earlier voyage to Bombay. 
Roberts had been orphaned at sixteen and raised by his uncle, Captain 
Joshua Roberts, who had established a mercantile shipping business in 
Buenos Aires. Edmund was eventually placed in charge of his uncle's 
business and in 1807 became sole proprietor upon his uncle's death.10 
However, this was the period of President Jefferson's embargo on foreign 
trade, which was followed by the disastrous period of the War of 1812. 
Roberts lost a fortune and struggled for years to recoup losses and preserve 
his interest in his uncle's business. In 1827 he borrowed a sum of money, 
chartered the brig Mary Ann, acquired a cargo on consignment, and in 
October of that year arrived in Zanzibar to attempt to sell his cargo.11 
Roberts encountered considerable obstacles to trade in Zanzibar, 
however. Prominent among these was that he was forced to conduct business 
14 
through the agents ofSayyid Said Al-Busaid, ruler of Muscat, Zanzibar and 
its dependencies. In Zanzibar, all visiting merchants were at the mercy of his 
agents. They were subject to delays in payment, to the substitution of 
undesirable goods for those originally contracted, and to inflated prices. 
Additionally, commissions had to be paid to agents not actually hired by the 
merchants; taxes of seven and a half percent had to be paid on exports and 
imports; and a $100.00 fee had to be paid for trading rights.12 At the same 
time, Roberts was of the opinion that the British were unfairly allowed to 
deal freely in the Zanzibar market, since they were Said's primary ally. 
In January, 1828, Said bin Sultan arrived in Zanzibar from Muscat for 
his first visit to Zanzibar, the island that was soon to become the co-capital of 
his realm and his principal place of residence.13 Roberts sought an 
immediate audience with Said in order to protest the treatment given 
American traders by his agents in Zanzibar. Roberts took the liberty of 
representing himself as an American official (he had once been named 
American Consul to Demerara, British Guyana, a post which he did not 
take).14 Regardless, the deception succeeded. Sayyid Said welcomed the self-
appointed American official and granted him a number of audiences wherein 
Roberts had the opportunity to express his and other American traders' 
grievances. Roberts asked that American traders be given equal footing with 
the British in the Sultan's ports. Roberts went so far as to suggest that the 
Sultan's best political interests lay with the Americans, who desired only the 
pursuit oflegitimate trade and had none of the secondary political and 
territorial aspirations in the region that one found in the British and 
French.15 
15 
For his part, Sayyid Said saw great advantages in a strong commercial 
relationship with the United States. Not only would the Americans lighten 
his dependence on his British allies, but it might even be useful playing them 
off against the British should the need one day arise.16 Accordingly, he 
suggested to Roberts the feasibility of a formal treaty with the United States, 
and expressed his desire to receive an American mission for the purpose of 
negotiating and signing such a treaty. Additionally, he asked that Roberts 
inform his government of Said's appeal for military equipment that he might 
use to drive the Portuguese out of Mozambique as well as control the Mazrui 
family in Mombasa and old enemies in the Gulf. He promised to keep this 
request secret from the English.17 
Said bin Sultan's desire to place diplomatic and commercial relations 
with the United States on an official treaty basis was based on both political 
and economic reasoning. Said faced significant challenges to his power base 
in Oman, East Africa and the Arabian Gulf. Furthermore, his allies the 
British were increasing their power in the Indian Ocean. The Americans, on 
the other hand, were seen as the new power in the area, and one without 
territorial ambitions. Consequently, Said felt that he could deal with 
Americans freely without undue fear of compromising his independence. 
EDMUND ROBERTS AND THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE 
Upon his return to the United States in May, 1828, Roberts 
immediately urged action on the part of the American government to support 
American trade in Zanzibar and Muscat.18 Roberts' efforts began with 
intensive lobbying of the chairman of the powerful Senate Commerce 
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Committee, Senator Levi Woodbury, who was a strong supporter of New 
England's commercial expansion. A fellow native of New Hampshire, and 
related to Roberts through marriage, Woodbury showed great interest in 
Roberts' position. In response to Woodbury's interest, Roberts prepared a 
lengthy communication in which he related an account of his most interesting 
conversations with Said as well as summarizing Said's political position and 
the range of his power through the Gulf and East Africa.19 Unfortunately for 
Roberts, however, despite Woodbury's interest and influence, the senator's 
efforts came to nothing. Said's territories were unknown to most Americans, 
after all, and the nation had just taken a significant new turn toward 
domestic issues and westward expansion under President Andrew Jackson. 20 
Two years later, however, in May, 1831, Senator Woodbury became 
President Jackson's Secretary of the Navy. In this capacity, Woodbury was 
finally able to persuade Jackson to send a special agent to Muscat and the 
Far East. At the same time, President Jackson received a cordial letter from 
Sayyid Said, delivered through one Captain Burnham, expressing his desire 
to formulate a commercial treaty between their two countries.21 Through 
Woodbury's influence, Roberts was invited to Washington and the State 
Department named him Special Agent to negotiate treaties with Siam, 
Cochin-China and Muscat. In his special instructions to Roberts, Secretary of 
State Edward Livingstone informed him that his mission was to be kept 
secret from the English, Dutch, and French, whose interests might be to 
thwart the objectives the president had in view.22 Roberts was further 
informed that the American government had no political or territorial 
ambitions in these regions. In the Secretary of State's words: ~e never make 
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conquests or ask any nation to let us establish ourselves in their country, as 
the English, the French and Dutch. "23 
In March, 1832, Roberts sailed for the Far East aboard the U.S. sloop 
of war, Peacock. His primary mission was to meet, confer with, and negotiate 
treaties with the rulers of Siam, Cochin-China, and Muscat. Roberts was 
listed on the ship's manifest as the captain's clerk in order to maintain the 
secrecy of the mission. 24 Roberts' mission to Cochin-China failed because he 
refused to kowtow to the ruler and was ultimately denied an audience. In 
Siam, Roberts succeeded in negotiating a trade agreement. Following 
diplomatic efforts in Cochin-China and Siam, Roberts at last arrived in 
Muscat on September 18, 1833.25 
Said bin Sultan received Roberts like an old friend. He held a warm 
reception and Roberts delivered a letter from President Jackson. During their 
negotiations, Roberts pointed out that contrary to the English, French, and 
Dutch, the American government's goal was merely a mutual commercial 
treaty with Said's dominions. However, Said then made a surprising 
proposal: he offered the Americans a commercial establishment anywhere in 
his territories if they would agree to help him conquer Mombasa.26 Roberts 
refused Said's proposal outright, explaining that the U.S. was only interested 
in forming a commercial treaty, not in becoming involved in regional political 
conflicts. Said relented and the first Omani-American treaty, "The Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce," was signed on September 21, 1833.27 
This Treaty of 1833 gave the Americans considerable trading 
advantage. American traders were to be afforded "most favored nation" status 
and be allowed to trade freely in all ports in the Sultan's realm, paying no 
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fees beyond a five percent import tax on all goods landed in the Sultan's 
ports. Even common pilotage fees were dropped for American traders. This 
provision for free American access to all of the Sultan's ports was soon to 
cause considerable difficulties for Said when other nations were to press him 
for access to areas on the mainland coast opposite Zanzibar. These coastal 
ports were presently closed to all but American traders. Furthermore, the 
U.S. was given broad rights in the establishment of a consulate; its properties 
and the person of its occupant were to be inviolable, and only a complaint 
directly to Washington could result in his removal. In addition, the American 
Consul was given complete power over all disputes concerning Americans and 
their property. Unfortunately, however, no mention was made of disputes 
between Americans and Omanis in Said's dominions, an oversight that would 
cause much trouble between Said and the second American Consul in 
Zanzibar some years later. In exchange for these concessions, Said bin Sultan 
was given the rights of most favored nation for any vessel he might send to 
the United States. The only restriction placed upon his trade was a 
temporary one: that powder, muskets, and shot could only be sold in 
Zanzibar, and only to the government. This clause was a concession to Said, 
who at the time was embroiled in a rebellion in Mombasa orchestrated by the 
Mazrui family.28 
Both Sayyid Said and Roberts were quite pleased and satisfied with 
the conclusion of the treaty. For his part, Said was happy that he was treated 
as an equal by President Jackson. Said viewed the treaty as an opportunity to 
form a new political friendship that would eventually enhance his own 
prestige as well as bolstering his economy through trade. On the other hand, 
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Roberts was quite pleased that his first diplomatic foray had concluded with 
such pleasing results, having succeeded in obtaining for American traders 
free access to the entirety of the Sultan's dominions. This was quite a 
different state of affairs from when he first arrived in Zanzibar aboard the 
brig Mary Ann just six years before. 
THE BRITISH BACKLASH 
If Roberts and Sayyid Said were pleased with themselves over their 
treaty, the British surely were not. They had become accustomed to American 
vessels throughout the Pacific, Southern Asia, and the Indian Ocean, and 
they had developed a delicate balance of power with the other European 
colonial powers--the French in Cochin-China, the Portuguese in Mozambique, 
and the Dutch in Batavia--but this new development of a U.S. warship with a 
diplomatic emissary expanding American interests in the region was too 
much.29 In fact, the British government in Bombay showed almost paranoid 
concern about American contact with Said. A British resident in the Gulf 
informed the Bombay government of the Omani-American Treaty of 1833, 
further reporting Said's alleged offer of an American settlement on the 
African mainland if the U.S. would agree to assist with putting down the 
Mazrui rebellion in Mombasa.30 As a result of these reports, the British 
government at Bombay decided in 1834 to send an official to Zanzibar to 
investigate this and other rumors concerning American contact with Said bin 
Sultan emanating from Zanzibar. In February, 1834, the British 
representative, one Captain Hart, arrived in Zanzibar aboard H.M.S. 
Imo~ene. 
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Oman and Britain had had diplomatic relations since the late 
eighteenth century. Between 1789 and 1800 the two governments (Britain 
represented by its administration in Bombay) signed a number of treaties 
forbidding Oman's commercial intercourse with the French and Dutch during 
their war with the British.31 However, there was nothing in these treaties 
that would prevent Said from entering into commercial treaties with the 
United States. On the other hand, British-Omani ties were close. Said had 
supported the British military expedition against the Qawasim in the Gulf in 
1819, while in turn the British had supported Said's claim over Mombasa in 
1824.32 Understandably, then, the British were concerned over these new 
rumors. 
However, in meetings with Said at his palace, Captain Hart found that 
the 1833 treaty with the U.S. was perfectly innocent. There were no 
provisions for the concession of territory nor the grant of American military 
aid for use against the Mazrui in Mombasa. 33 Hart reported to his 
government, then, that nothing more was afoot in Zanzibar that increased 
American commercial activity, resulting in nothing more than greater 
competition for the British.34 However, Hart also brought to Said's attention 
that the British enjoyed no commercial treaties of the kind just concluded 
with the United States, and that surely Britain deserved such trading 
advantages even more than did the Americans. 35 Said assured Hart that he 
was committed to British friendship and that he would give Britain the same 
commercial advantages that Americans enjoyed through the treaty.36 The 
result of this promise was the signing of the British-Omani treaty of 1839. 
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ROBERTS' THIRD VOYAGE 
Roberts returned to Washington flushed with the great success of his 
diplomatic mission, the negotiation of trade agreements with both Muscat 
and its possessions and with the Kingdom of Siam. Roberts' success 
constituted the first American diplomatic contact with an Asian country in 
which American commercial interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean 
would be enhanced. President Jackson expressed his gratitude to Roberts, 
and the Senate ratified the Omani-American Treaty without significant 
dissent on June 30, 1834. Roberts was selected and authorized to exchange 
the ratified treaty with Oman. 37 Before leaving the U.S. on his mission to 
exchange ratified treaties, Roberts received instructions and arrangements 
from Secretary of State John Forsyth, which indicated he would visit Japan 
for the same purpose once his business in Zanzibar was complete. 
On March 25, 1835, Roberts once again sailed for Oman, reaching 
Zanzibar with two vessels in September. Sayyid Said was absent, but Roberts 
was welcomed by Khalid bin Said, governor of Zanzibar, who welcomed them 
royally. Shortly thereafter, Roberts continued with a small group aboard one 
of their ships, the Peacock, to Muscat for the purpose of exchanging ratified 
treaties with Said. En route, however, the Peacock struck a coral reef and ran 
aground on Masira Island, an Omani possession some 400 miles from Muscat. 
Short of water and other provisions, and fearful of their vulnerability to 
pirates, Roberts along with six others departed the stricken ship in a small 
boat and set out for Muscat, which they reached in three days. Sayyid Said 
immediately dispatched armed rescue parties to assist the Peacock, but 
before they reached the ship, the Peacock managed to refloat itself and 
proceeded to Muscat unassisted. 38 
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Immediately, Roberts and Sayyid Said set to work on the formal 
notifications concerning the treaty. The only obstacle was to determine the 
exact date the treaty would go into effect. Said asked Roberts to set the day, 
and they then agreed on June 30, 1834, which was the date of the treaty's 
ratification in the United States. All American merchants who had sailed 
after this date were entitled to rebates on fees they had already paid in 
transacting business in the Sultan's ports.39 
Roberts' work in Muscat successfully completed, he at last departed for 
Siam to complete the transfer of a treaty he had formed with that country. 
Unfortunately, however, Roberts did not live to see the fruit of his labors. He 
contracted a fever in Siam and died in Macao on June 12, 1835, at the age of 
fifty-one. He was buried in Macao's East India Company cemetery while the 
guns of the Peacock fired a final salute.40 On December 6, 1836, President 
Jackson informed the Senate that ratification of the Omani-American treaty 
had been duly exchanged--a treaty, he say, "which promised great advantages 
to our enterprising merchants and navigators."41 
Thus, Roberts' diplomatic efforts set the stage for the future of 
relations between the United States and Oman. A treaty was in place, 
relations were friendly, and the way was open for unlimited commercial 
development. The first American Consul was to reach Zanzibar just a year 
later, in 1837, and Muscat just a year after that. Through Roberts' efforts, the 
door to trade throughout Oman and East Africa had been opened to 
merchants from the United States. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE WATERS YEARS, 1837-1845 
SAID BIN SULTAN CONSOLIDATES POWER IN EAST AFRICA 
During the period of Edmund Roberts' shuttle diplomacy between 
Washington and Muscat to promote the ratification of the Treaty of 1833, the 
frequency of visits of American vessels to the port of Zanzibar continued to 
grow. American merchants were creating a virtual economic monopoly. 
During the two-year period of 1832-1834, for example, 32 of 44 ships visiting 
Zanzibar were American. Twenty of these originated in Salem, three each 
from New York and Boston, while the remainder were from unspecified 
American ports. In contrast, during the same period only seven British 
vessels and one each from France and Spain called at the port. However, 
while Zanzibar prospered, the port of Muscat saw the arrival of only one 
vessel in the seven-year period prior to 1835.1 
At the same time, Said bin Sultan began turning his attention to East 
Africa for the purpose of establishing political and economic power in the 
region. He encountered an obstacle, however, in the existing influence of the 
Mazrui family of Mombasa, who stood opposed to his influence and refused to 
recognize his authority in Mombasa. The Mazrui family ruled in Mombasa as 
governor [Wali) for the Yaaruba Dynasty, who had dominated the region 
since driving the Portuguese out of Fort Jesus in Mombasa in 1698.2 By the 
year 1700, the entire coast of East Africa had passed into the hands of the 
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Yaaruba, who in turn appointed several governors (or Wali) in the important 
coast towns and islands. Among these was Nasir bin Abdulla, head of the 
Mazrui family, who was appointed Wali of Mombasa. 
On the other hand, Ahmed bin Said was elected Imam in 17 4 7 and 
ruled Oman and East Africa in the name of the Al-Busaid family since that 
time. But the Mazrui governor of Mombasa refused to recognize Said's 
sovereignty and declared independence. 3 During the first twenty years of his 
reign, however, Said was too fully occupied with troubles in Oman and the 
Arabian Gulf to give a great deal of attention to East African possessions. In 
1822 he sent his first military expedition to subdue the Mazrui. However, this 
military expedition failed. 
At this time the Mazrui asked the British for protection in maintaining 
their power in Mombasa, but the British governor in Bombay refused the 
request. However, their request was granted by a Captain William Owen, 
who signed a protection agreement on February 8, 1824.4 On July 25, 1826, 
though, the British government nullified Owen's agreement, citing Britain's 
Treaty of 1822 with Sayyid Said, under which he assisted the British in 
crushing the Qawasim power in the Gulf. 5 Thus, the Mazrui lost their British 
protection and their position was rendered perilous. 
On January 7, 1828, Said bin Sultan himselfled a large military 
expedition against the Mazrui, but it failed to subdue them completely. Upon 
his arrival in 1828 in Zanzibar he made his first contact with an American 
official, Edmund Roberts. He discussed with Roberts future Omani-American 
relations, a discussion which eventually culminated in the Treaty of 1833. 
Between 1822 and 1837 Said made several attempts at subduing the 
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Mazrui by military means, but not until February of 1837 did he finally 
succeed at overcoming them. The Mazrui's ruler, Rashid bin Salem, and sixty-
six of his supporters were exiled to Bandar Abbas, and Said's power in East 
Africa and Zanzibar was solidified. 6 
THE CAPITAL IS MOVED TO ZANZIBAR 
In the course of his lengthy military effort to gain control over East 
Africa, Said began the development of the economic system in East Africa, 
and in 1832 he decided to move the capital of his realm to Zanzibar. This he 
did in 1840. There were several reasons for Said's move, most prominently his 
tenuous grip on the W ahabbis threat and internal disputes. Furthermore, his 
military expeditions to capture Baharin had failed, so that he settled on a 
strategic position between the mainland of East Africa and the western 
shores of the Indian Ocean from which to oversee his realm. Lastly, Zanzibar 
had a good harbor, a favorable climate, and fertile soil. These features would 
enhance Zanzibar's attractiveness as a trading center, thereby contributing to 
Said's wealth. 7 
Said took other steps as well to improve Zanzibar's attractiveness as a 
trading center. In 1828 he introduced the cultivation of clove trees, a crop 
that had only previously been known to grow in the East Indies. He ordered 
the landowners of the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba to cultivate the crop, 
which eventually became an economic mainstay of Zanzibar. By the 1860s, 
Zanzibar had become the world's major producer of cloves. 8 Other measures 
to enhance Zanzibar's economy included creating liberal customs policies to 
attract foreign merchants. He also allowed Indians to trade in Zanzibar, who 
brought with them administrative and financial skills that Said felt were 
essential to developing a trading center. 9 
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Said's greatest accomplishments, however, were the treaties he 
negotiated with the United States (1833), Great Britain (1839), and France 
(1844). With this foundation, Said was in a position to develop an economic 
and political hegemony over most of East Africa. The success of his policy was 
in many ways symbolically recognized in 1837 with the arrival in Zanzibar of 
the American Consul, Richard P. Waters, the first foreign consul to be posted 
in Said's new capital. 
RICHARD P. WATERS ARRIVES IN ZANZIBAR 
Waters was from Salem, Massachusetts, was a merchant, and in 1832 
became involved in the abolitionist movement. He became a member of the 
Essex County Anti-Slavery Society in 1836 and in that context became 
friendly with the Reverend James T. Woodbury, brother of Levi Woodbury, 
Secretary of the Navy to President Andrew Jackson. With this background, 
Waters circulated comfortably in both commercial and political circles. His 
friends and acquaintances included on the one hand John Bertram and 
Michael Shepard of the trading company that bore their names, and on the 
other hand included political figures such as ex-Senator Silshue and 
Representative Stephen C. Phillips.10 
When the post was first established, Waters became interested in 
receiving the consular position in Zanzibar. Commercial and political 
acquaintances encouraged him to apply for the position, and in February, 
1836, Waters visited Washington, where he was introduced to President 
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Jackson by Representative Phillips. Waters was subsequently appointed to 
the position of American Consul to Zanzibar.11 Prior to his departure in 
October, 1836, Secretary of State John Forsyth gave Waters his diplomatic 
instructions. He was instructed not to take commercial advantage of his 
position, but must adhere to the "usual privileges" granted by the treaty of 
1833. Furthermore, he was not to exploit the fact that the consul's person and 
property were diplomatically inviolate.12 This last instruction derived from 
the fact that during that period consuls were more frequently commercial 
than diplomatic agents. They received nominal salaries from the State 
Department, but their primary financial support came from their roles 
representing commercial firms in their post. However, Waters was not 
affiliated with any single commercial firm at the time he arrived at Zanzibar. 
Waters' reasons for wishing to go to Zanzibar were varied. A 
businessman as well as devoutly spiritual, his reasons were at once both 
religious and commercial. In his diaries he expressed his convictions: "I have 
desired to be made useful to the souls of these pagans among whom I am 
called to reside. That my going to dwell with them ... may be a means of 
introducing the gospel of Christ to them ... that the way may soon be opened 
for missionaries to reside there."13 At the same time, however, his economic 
interests were not altogether subordinate. As he expressed it in his diaries 
once again, "I want money for my own sake, for my dear mother, sisters and 
brothers sake, and to do good with."14 
Waters arrived in Zanzibar on March 18, 1837, and was welcomed in 
the harbor by Omani officials. "They all welcomed me to Zanzibar," he 
recorded in his diary; "I invited them to take a glass of wine with me, but they 
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declined by saying that it was against their religion to drink wine; they drank 
a tumbler oflemonade."15 On the following day Waters was given a reception 
by Sayyid Said, at which Said invited him to sit in his own place of honor at 
the table. In Waters' words: "He [Said] received me with great apparent good 
feeling, and invited me to take the seat which he always occupied.16 Waters 
presented his diplomatic credentials along with a letter to Said from 
President Jackson. In the letter the president expressed his thanks to Said 
for his assistance to the ship Peacock, and he went on to express his wish that 
they promote a strong relationship between the two countries. For his part, 
Sayyid Said was so pleased with Waters and his posting as the first American 
Consul in his country that he offered him any house in Zanzibar he might 
wish, and further offered to furnish and provide it to the new American 
Consul at no charge.17 The dominant tone, then, was that Waters was as 
much a friend to Said as he was diplomatic representative of the United 
States. Said frequently invited Waters to his plantation to visit and go riding. 
Said also provided not just a horse, but also put a boat at Waters' disposal for 
the conduct of his duties in Zanzibar. 
Waters was in an ideal position to represent not just his government's 
interests, but also those of his contacts in the Salem trading companies. Over 
time, Salem's merchants secured a corner on trade with Zanzibar. 
Recognizing this, another trading firm, Scoville and Britton, wished to secure 
a corner on the trading market with the Omani port of Muscat. To this end 
they approached the influential politician, Aurora Parker, with a request that 
he lobby for the appointment of an American consul in Muscat. He did so, and 
on the basis of his close ties to the Van Buren administration succeeded in 
persuading them of the need for such a consul. On October 4, 1838, the new 
American Consul to Muscat, Henry Marshall, arrived in Muscat to take up 
his post.18 Marshall, of course, had ties to the trading firm of Scoville and 
Britton. 
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Upon his arrival, he was welcomed cordially by Thawani bid Said, 
governor of Muscat.19 However, Marshall did not last long in Muscat. A 
combination of poor health and the bankruptcy of Scoville and Britton led to 
his departure after only a few months. Before departing, though, he 
appointed as acting American Consul the man who had acted as translator of 
the Omani-American treaty of 1833, Said bin Khalfan, who was eventually 
appointed to the full position of consul in Muscat in 1843. This development 
came about largely due to his affiliation with the trading firm of Bertram and 
Shepard. In 1845, however, Kalfan died, whereupon his duties reverted to his 
American associates.20 Said bin Khalfan had been considered a leader of a 
group of an anti-British persuasion. Their sympathies were strongly pro-
American. He provided a variety of consular services for visiting American 
captains as well as serving as the principal Omani merchant and broker for 
American trading vessels. 21 
Thus, while Said bin Khalfan represented American interests in 
Muscat, Waters was doing the same at Zanzibar. Unfortunately, though, 
Waters encountered difficulties in Zanzibar with the master of the Customs 
House, J airam Sewji. 
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THE WATERS-SEWJI MONOPOLY 
Jairam Sewji was a leading member of the Indian community of 
merchants prominent in nineteenth century Zanzibar. A businessman and 
proprietor of his own firm, he had close ties with Sayyid Said. In fact, Sewji 
rented the concession to the Zanzibar custom house, which in 1835 totaled 
$150,000. His contract with Said was for five years, renewable for another 
five, with the rental increasing steadily throughout the period. Over twenty 
years from 1860 to 1880, rental on the custom house concession increased 
from $196,000 to $500,00o.22 
Sewji maintained control of the custom house until his death in 1886. 
By then he had amassed a great fortune, leaving $3 million in cash in his 
will. 23 He was unquestionably a very powerful man in commercial circles, 
controlling the import and export of all goods through the port of Zanzibar as 
well as on the coast through his agents. 
When Waters arrived in Zanzibar he faced difficulties with Sewji 
almost from the start. For example, Sewji not only required that all American 
merchants bring their exports to the custom house for inspection, but further 
required that they pay the cost oflaborers to transport the goods to and from 
the custom house. Of course, Sewji controlled the laberors. In addition to this, 
Sewji charged all Banyans who did business with American merchants a five 
percent duty on their goods sold to compensate for the loss of export taxes he 
was unable to charge due to provisions of the Omani-American Treaty of 
1833. Waters protested these actions to both the State Department and to 
Said, as he feared Sewji's actions might threaten or inhibit American trade. 
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Although Said expressed his overall support of Sewji, he did act to stop him 
from exacting the forced charges for labor as well as the five percent duty he 
was charging on goods sold to American traders, but only on the condition 
that the United States government officially protest these actions as in 
violation of the Treaty of 1833. Unfortunately, however, the U.S. State 
Department's position was that the issues were too minor and did not merit 
formal protest. Nonetheless, in the aftermath Said promised Waters that he 
would end the charging of the five percent duty.24 
With time, however, Waters ceased his protestations against Sewji's 
activities, deciding that he was better off cooperating than struggling with 
him. In the interest of profitability, the two formed an alliance that enabled 
them to dominate the import-export trade in Zanzibar as well as exclude both 
the English and any American traders who refused to deal through them. In 
short, as master of the custom house, Sewji could block, or at least make very 
difficult, any transactions that Waters did not approve, which gave Waters 
priority over all other foreign merchants on the island of Zanzibar. In 
exchange, Sewji was given a monopoly position as broker for the Salem 
merchants, determining what goods were sold, to whom, and at what price.25 
The best of all possible descriptions of the Waters-Sewji monopoly of the 
Zanzibar trade is contained in Waters' own words, in his instructions to his 
vice-consul P.S. Parker on the occasion of Waters' temporary absence from 
Zanzibar in 1840: 
On the arrival of any American vessel in Zanzibar, the captain will 
visit you soon after the vessel comes to anchor. It will be your duty 
... to state all you know about the market, the prices, and probable 
quantity in the market of such articles as they may wish. 
After you have engaged to do the business of any vessel, you will 
do well to hold a conversation with Jairam bin Seva [Sewji], the 
custom master. Inform him what the vessel has to sell and what she 
wishes for return cargo . . . . He will propose at once to call the 
merchants together at my house; show them the samples of cotton 
and fix a price for them. Should the captain conclude to sell at the 
offers made, Jairam will be the person to whom you will deliver the 
goods and also charge them to, he being the only person you are to 
know in the business .... Before you conclude the sale, you will talk 
to J airam in regard to what you may want for return cargo. 26 
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Thus, the Waters-Sewji system monopolized all trade passing through 
Zanzibar. Merchants wishing to trade had no alternative but to deal with this 
partnership. Some protested, notably the British merchant Robert Brown 
Norsworthy, who took his protest to both Said and to the British Consul 
Hamerton, but to no avail. 27 
Both Waters and Sewji made considerable fortunes under their joint 
monopoly. Sewji's greatest source of income, despite the considerable duties 
he was collecting, was his commissions as broker for the American trade. 
Waters, too, enjoyed income as a businessman and broker for American, and 
particularly Salem, trading firms. In 1839 he wrote to his brother William 
that "Jairam and myself are on the best of terms. He respects me and fears 
me and at the same time I have his confidence. I do nine-tenths of my 
business with Jairam.28 
And because of this arrangement, and because of Waters' ties to the 
Salem trade, it was the Salem traders who enjoyed the majority of the 
trading opportunities in Zanzibar, and largely free of interference from 
foreign (i.e., British) or other American competition. Between 1837 and 1840, 
Waters represented the interests of the Salem firm of Bertram and Shepard, 
whose officials has worked to secure his appointment as consul, and in 1840 
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he became agent for the firm of Pingree, West.29 Their control was so great, 
in fact, that the British trading firm of Newman, Hunt and Christopher gave 
up and abandoned the Zanzibar trade. From 1837 to 1841 American 
merchants were left free to dominate the Zanzibar trade specifically due to 
conditions created by the Waters-Sewji alliance. 30 
BRITISH CONSUL HAMERTON 
It was under these conditions ·that in May, 1841, the first British 
Consul to Zanzibar, Captain Hamerton, arrived on the island. Hamerton was 
shocked by the decline of British influence in Zanzibar. Not only were the 
Americans in full control of commercial activity passing through the port of 
Zanzibar, but that they enjoyed virtually a total political monopoly as well, 
discovering that Sayyid Said was surrounded by an Omani political faction 
which favored the Americans over the British. 
When Hamerton first visited the Sultan's palace, therefore, he was 
greeted with great disrespect. A number of the Sultan's officials spoke loudly 
of the wealth and superiority of the Americans. Furthermore, Hamerton 
observed in the palace two paintings hung up on either side of the Sultan's 
chair in the royal reception room: "The subjects were naval engagements 
between American and English ships; the ship of England is represented as 
just taken by the American, and the English ensign is being hauled down and 
the American hoisted at the masthead."31 This was Hamerton's first 
impression of the political climate in Zanzibar. 
However, the British were Oman's allies in the Gulf. The two countries 
had signed the Mosely Treaty of 1822 as well as the Commercial Treaty of 
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1839. Said may have wished to demonstrate to the British through Hamerton 
that there were alternatives to an alliance with the British, but the fact 
remained that the British were the dominant military power in the Indian 
Ocean. Hamerton made this point, and the next time he visited the Sultan he 
observed that the paintings which had previously been hung in the visiting 
chamber had been replaced by one depicting the British defeat of the Turko-
Egyptian fleet at Navarino in 1827. 32 
Hamerton was not so easily swayed. He had no illusions, despite the 
gesture of the paintings, that the Americans clearly dominated both political 
and commercial activity in Zanzibar. His mandate from the British 
government was that he should arrive in Zanzibar to protect British 
interests, both political and commercial, and to influence suppression of the 
slave trade. For these tasks he was well prepared. At thirty-seven years of 
age, he was a veteran of military service in India, where he rose to the rank of 
captain, and was an agent of the East India Company. He had some 
diplomatic experience and spoke Arabic well. Hamerton was well prepared to 
serve British interests in Zanzibar.33 
At the time Hamerton arrived in Zanzibar, Waters happened to be on a 
trip back to America, settling business in Salem. An indication of the 
closeness of the relationship between Waters and Sayyid Said is in the 
latter's offering Waters use of his private vessel, the Sultanah, which was 
embarking on a trip for New York.34 Waters declined the offer, however, and 
embarked in his brother's ship. Waters returned to Zanzibar in June, 1841. 
Hamerton proceeded to launch a campaign to break up the Waters-
Sewji monopoly. As a representative of the Bombay government and protector 
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of the British and Indian trade, he had little other choice. As early as June 28 
he wrote to Sayyid Said complaining that Waters and Sewji had prevented a 
British merchant from trading unless he agreed to pay commissions to 
Waters and Sewji. Hamerton expressed his indignation to Said at such an 
arrangement, particularly when it so blatantly discriminated against British 
commercial activity. 35 In Hamerton's other role, that of political 
representative of the British Crown government, he felt obliged to also work 
toward weakening the significant political influence the Americans possessed 
in Zanzibar. Such an effort, he felt, required a little propaganda. For example, 
Hamerton took pains in a letter to Lord Palmerston to describe the voyage of 
the Sultan's ship the Sultanah to New York. He narrated a voyage in which 
Said's sailors were tormented continually by a mob who crowded around to 
see the Arab workers, whom they looked upon as curiosities, invading their 
privacy and offering personal insults like pulling on their beards.36 This was 
Hamerton's idea of undermining Omani-American relations. 
In fact, the true story of the voyage of the Sultanah was far more 
prosaic. It was bound for New York, where it arrived April 30, 1840, bearing 
letters and very fine and valuable gifts for President Martin Van Buren. 
Unfortunately, the timing was awkward. President Van Buren was in the 
midst of the 1840 presidential campaign, and his opponents in congress and 
the press seized on these gifts from the Sultan and made them into a 
campaign issue. After long debate and congressional action, the gifts were 
made property of the U.S. government, some sold off and their proceeds 
added to the U.S. treasury, others held simply in the name of the U.S. 
government. 37 In this way the issue was finally resolved, its intended 
purpose of simply slinging mud at an incumbent presidential candidate 
having been accomplished. 
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Despite this partisan political haggling, the visit of the Sultanah and 
its officers, and ofSayyid Said's representative, Ahmad bin Na'aman, was a 
diplomatic success. They were feted in New York, were received by the mayor 
of the city, given special gifts and tours, and generally royally received. 
Ahmad bin Na'aman received gifts from the U.S. government for Sayyid Said. 
The significance of this first Arab mission to the United States is highlighted 
in the work of Professor Eilts: "Hopefully, therefore, these paragraphs may 
draw back the curtain of obscurity which time has draped over Ahmad bin 
Na'aman and recall briefly a forgotten, but deserving, first Arab mission to 
our shores. "38 
For his part, Hamerton continued his campaign to weaken American 
influence. Early on he decided that Ahmad bin Na'aman was the leader of the 
pro-American group in Zanzibar, a group that Hamerton called bitterly "The 
American Party," and which he believed had persuaded Sayyid Said to take a 
strong anti-British stance in Zanzibar.39 And of course, Hamerton was 
correct. The pro-American party, with Waters at the nominal head, took great 
pains to weaken the British position in Zanzibar. For example, they 
persuaded Said to require that Indians sign a declaration giving up their 
British citizenship and accepting Omani sovereignty. However, the Indians 
refused, the British protested most vigorously, and Hamerton eventually won 
out on this issue.40 Waters also went so far as to lie outright upon return 
from a visit to Bombay, telling Said that British power in India was in ruins, 
their troops defeated, and their foreign agents (i.e., Hamerton) acting without 
41 
authority.41 
However, by 1842 Hamerton was able to report to his government that 
his activities had succeeded in breaking the American monopoly in Zanzibar 
and that British subjects finally enjoyed equal rights of trade. 42 Hamerton 
took full credit for this development. In fact, though, there was a complex 
array of factors and developments which led to the breakdown of the Waters-
Sewji monopoly and American dominance in Zanzibar. 
COLLAPSE OF THE AMERICAN MONOPOLY IN ZANZIBAR 
Between 1837 and 1841 Waters was easily able to control, manipulate 
and dominate the Zanzibar economy, primarily because it was small, outside 
political influences were few, and the local political structure was amenable 
to his designs. However, through the 1840s the port grew, outside interests 
(particularly those of the British), and the general economic climate 
developed in such a way that even an adept manipulator would be hard 
pressed to manage developments. A great many more American and 
European vessels were visiting Zanzibar and Waters found himselfless and 
less able to control the market. Sewji also balked. He wished to end his 
relationship with Waters, since the great increase in the volume of trading no 
longer made it practical to restrict trade. 
Waters saw Hamerton as being to a large degree the instrument of the 
downfall of his economic monopoly, and the remainder of their time in 
Zanzibar saw hostile and strained relations between them. Said, too, disliked 
Hamerton, whom he felt was vain, proud, and condescending.43 In fact, in 
1844 Said wrote the British Foreign Office requesting that Hamerton be 
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removed from his post. Britain's Lord Aberdeen responded to Said's letter and 
apologized for Hamerton's behavior and ordered his removal.44 But the 
Bombay government was unwilling to remove Hamerton because he was so 
highly qualified, including the fact that he spoke Arabic. At the same time, in 
London Aberdeen was succeeded by Palmerston, and the result was that 
Hamerton retained his position. His relations with Sayyid Said improved and 
Hamerton remained British consul at Zanzibar until his death in 1857. 
Another consequence of the breakdown of the Waters monopoly was 
that the competitive edge previously enjoyed by Salem traders broke down. 
As a result, competition among American trading firms became intense. 
However, the early edge enjoyed by the Salem traders proved advantageous, 
and the Salem firm of Bertram, Shepard controlled American trade in the 
region for the bulk of the 1840s and 1850s.45 However, achieving this 
dominant position had not been easy, nor particularly ethical. Bertram, 
Shepard got their early edge from Waters, who was their agent in Zanzibar 
until 1841, when he jumped firms and became an agent for Pingree, West. At 
that time Bertram, Shepard sent another agent to Zanzibar, one John F. 
Webb. For three years after this the competition for dominance between the 
two big firms was fierce. It was so fierce, in fact, that it eventually threatened 
the profitability of both. In 1844, the two firms colluded and agreed to end 
their competitive practices and entered into a cooperative effort to share 
trade and to the best of their ability block access to Zanzibar for other 
American and European merchants.46 
The collapse of the Waters-Sewji monopoly marked the end of Waters' 
tenure in Zanzibar. Citing health reasons, Waters resigned his post and 
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departed Zanzibar for the United States in July 1845.4 7 He never again 
returned to Zanzibar, although he and Said corresponded regularly, and the 
Sultan frequently sent him gifts. 
THE WATERS LEGACY, IN RETROSPECT 
When Sayyid Said lost Waters, he lost a valuable friend and associate. 
If his methods appear somewhat less than ethical from a present-day view, to 
Sayyid Said his presence was invaluable. Their relationship was personal and 
professional, political, economic and cultural. He did everything from 
translate American newspaper articles for the Sultan to advising him in the 
negotiation of commercial treaties with European countries. A good 
illustration of the role Waters played for the Sultan may be seen in a letter 
from him to his brother John: 
The French brig of war Messenger is here for the purpose of making a 
commercial treaty with his highness, the Sultan, and I have been 
entrusted by his highness with the business of arranging a treaty. I 
have been busily engaged on the subject the last ten days--and much 
to the satisfaction of his highness and his sons. To arrange this treaty 
was one of the objects which induced me to remain here this year, as 
his highness was very desirous for me to take charge of the matter on 
his behalf. 48 
Waters had been, after all, the first diplomatic representative of a 
Western nation to take up a post in Zanzibar. His tenure coincided with the 
evolution of Zanzibar from a trading backwater to a prominent port of call 
and a busy harbor. Whereas American merchants were a rarity in 1837, by 
1845 they dominated the East Africa trade. Despite this, however, Waters 
unquestionably abused his post and his influence with the Sultan, not only 
politically in the course of influencing the development of commercial 
treaties, but also commercially, in his manipulation of the local political scene 
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to the advantage of his commercial liaisons and to the detriment of others. It 
was clearly not only unethical, but also illegal, for the American Consul to 
negotiate on behalf of a foreign country. 
However, Waters had a fair record as a diplomat, working vigorously 
toward the resolution of disputes between American vessels and the local 
government. This was particularly apt to occur in connection with the visits 
of American whaling vessels, when not infrequently crews would attempt to 
jump ship in Zanzibar, usually complaining of unfair treatment by the ship's 
officers, or of poor food or living quarters. Several of these incidents are on 
record, and in each Waters performed fairly and well. Some of those recorded 
include the incident of the whaler London Packet49, the whaling ship 
Emma50, and most particularly in the case of the whaling ship filn,, aboard 
which was the writer John Ross Browne engaged in the writing of his book, 
Etchings of a Whaling Cruise.51 
Although Waters was tough on whaling ship crews, he was a friend of 
the missionaries. He introduced arriving missionaries to Sayyid Said and 
encouraged them to stay in Zanzibar. In the words of a German missionary, 
Herr Krapf: "Mr. Waters, the American Consul, was a zealous friend to the 
mission. He wished me to remain in Zanzibar preaching on Sundays to its few 
Europeans; working among the Banyans from India; founding schools for the 
instruction of the native Swahilis and Arabs; and preparing books in the 
languages of the mainlands .... 52 
One of Waters' most important diplomatic achievements involved 
removing the ban on the selling of guns and powder in Said's dominions. The 
Omani-American commercial treaty of 1833 had banned the free sale of guns 
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and powder to anyone except the government of the Sayyid Said. The Sultan 
had insisted on this provision at the time of the treaty's negotiation, since at 
the time he was at war with the Mazrui. However, in 1838 Waters informed 
the Secretary of State that the Sultan had agreed to allow the American to 
sell guns and powder at their discretion in Said's lands. 53 On a more 
personal level, at Waters' request, Sayyid Said designated a plot of land to 
become a Western (i.e., Christian) cemetery.54 
The single major issue that Waters failed to accomplish in his time in 
Zanzibar, and which was to become the center ofa great crisis in the 
administration of his successor, Charles Ward, was the issue of direct trade 
on the coast of East Africa. This had always been forbidden to the French and 
English, but was permitted for Americans under Article II of the Treaty of 
1833. Said had withheld this trading from the British and French because he 
feared their presence on the coast would threaten his political and economic 
position. In 1833 he had no such fear of the Americans, since their economic 
and military power in the region was very limited. This was to change, 
however, and Sayyid Said soon repudiated Article II of the treaty and forbade 
Americans access to direct trade on the East African coast. The State 
Department contacted Waters and instructed him not to pursue the issue. 
Waters was in this way spared what could have become an intense crisis with 
his good friend the Sultan. Instead, the crisis was passed to his successor, 
Consul Charles Ward. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CHARLES WARD AND WILLIAM McMULLAN YEARS, 
1845-1856 
On January 20, 1846, Charles Ward arrived in Zanzibar as the second 
American Consul to Sayyid Said bin Sultan, ruler of Muscat and its 
dependencies, replacing Richard Waters, who resigned in July, 1845. During 
his years in Zanzibar, Ward formed strong business ties with the large Salem 
shipping and trading firm of Bertram and Shepard, for whom he served as 
agent in Zanzibar. As a consequence of his relationship with this firm, he 
settled in Salem after his return to the United States in 1850.1 
On January 21, 1846, the day after his arrival in Zanzibar, Ward 
presented his credentials to the Sayyid Said. The meeting went well and the 
Sultan was impressed enough with Ward to later write to President Polk: 
"Mr. Ward is a very sensible man and I feel very happy by his arrival. By the 
blessing of God the friendship of the American nation with the Arab is always 
and constantly increasing."2 At the outset ofWard,s tenure, then, Sayyid 
Said was quite pleased with the status ofOmani-American relations. 
However, relations between Ward and Said were soon to become strained, 
and relations between the two countries were to be tested. The breakdown in 
Ward,s and Said,s relationship came about for a number of reasons, but the 
upshot is that it resulted in the most controversial period in the history of 
early Omani-American relations.3 In fact, the controversies introduced 
during Ward's tenure as Consul ultimately led to the breaking off of 
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diplomatic relations between Oman and the United States. 
THE ANN PERRY AFFAIR 
Ward's problems with the Omani government began with the first 
crisis he faced as Consul. This occurred on August 30, 1846, with the arrival 
at Zanzibar of the American whaling ship, Ann Parry. On the night of August 
30, the crew of the Ann Parry. came ashore. They became drunk and 
disorderly, and fighting broke out between the ship's crew members and some 
of the local population. During the fighting an Omani customs official named 
Thabit was struck and later died from his wounds. The crewmen retired to 
their ship anchored nearby. Consul Ward investigated the incident. The 
ship's first mate verified the details of the fighting and informed Ward that 
one of his men had admitted to the killing.4 
Ward then reported to the Sultan in the form of a letter. He informed 
the Sultan that one man had confessed to the killing, expressed his grief at 
the loss of the Omani customs official, and suggested that one of the Sultan's 
judges hold a hearing in the presence of the U.S. Consul.5 This letter to the 
Sultan implied a commitment to assist with local justice. However, soon after 
this Ward sent the Sultan a second letter in which he informed Said that the 
First Mate had made an error, that the alleged confession was a mistake, and 
that he found no single crew member could accept blame for the killing. 6 
Sayyid Said sent a judge to the American Consulate to investigate the 
murder on his behalf. During this investigation the judge found no 
eyewitnesses to the murder, but turned to the evidence provided by the 
American Consul in which he provided details of the incident, including the 
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confession of the American sailor. On the basis of this, the Omanijudge 
determined that he could not punish the American sailor due to lack of 
evidence. Sayyid Said returned the case to Charles Ward, expecting that 
Ward would bear responsibility for producing the guilty sailor for 
punishment, or else make a restitution payment of $800.00 to the family of 
the deceased, as was customary. However, Ward insisted that his first letter 
was in error and that no American had acknowledged guilt in the incident. 
Moreover, Ward allowed the sailors to return to their ship, and the Ann Perry 
set saiI.7 
Because Ward failed to resolve the incident in accordance with Omani 
custom, the Sultan became angry and accused Ward of aiding and abetting 
the escape of the American sailors. The Sultan was convinced that Ward had 
ordered the ship out of port to circumvent Omani law, writing later to Ward: 
"You have sent the brig away and the whole ship."8 However, Ward denied 
ordering the ship out of Zanzibar. 
Ward reported on the Ann Pan:y. affair in a letter to Secretary of State 
Buchanan, including with it a letter from Sayyid Said to President Polk. In 
the latter, Said suggested that disputes between American citizens and 
Omani law be settled by treaty stipulation, and he requested of President 
Polk that the American government investigate the incident. 9 However, 
neither Ward's nor the Sultan's letters were answered, and the case was 
never settled. The Ann Parry. affair was left to lie dormant, promoting an 
ongoing strain in Omani-American relations. IO 
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INTERPRETING THE TREATY OF 1833 
The second important controversy to arise between Sayyid Said and 
Consul Charles Ward concerned the interpretation of the second article of the 
Omani-American Treaty of 1833. This treaty had given American merchants 
the right to trade in any of the ports under the Sultan's control. In 1841, 
Richard Waters, America's first Consul in Zanzibar, had expressed to the 
Sultan the desire of American merchants to trade not only in the Sultan's 
ports, but throughout the coast. However, Sayyid Said refused. Additionally, 
the Sultan sent a letter to then President John Tyler requesting that he be 
given a letter from the president authorizing him to prevent American 
merchants from direct trading on the coast. Oddly, though, the Sultan did not 
send this letter through regular diplomatic channels, but instead sent it 
personally with Captain Andrew Ward (no relation to Consul Charles Ward), 
who was a trusted friend of Sayyid Said. 
Meanwhile, Said sent four more letters to the President requesting a 
formal amendment of Article II of the Treaty of 1833, but the President did 
not respond. Said then asked Richard Waters to speak on his behalf when he 
returned to the United States. Waters had resigned his position as Consul at 
this time, and therefore asked the Sultan for full plenipotentiary powers to 
negotiate with the American Government on the issue. However, the Sultan 
rejected this idea.11 Consequently, Waters left Zanzibar upon completion of 
his tenure as Consul without any formal solution to the conflict over the 
Treaty of 1833. 
The roots of this conflict originated in the years when officials first 
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negotiated the Treaty of 1833. Article II of this treaty gave Americans the 
express right to purchase goods in any of the Sultan's ports. Trade expanded 
over the years, and by 1841 New England merchants, supported by former 
Consul Richard P. Waters, expressed a desire to fully exploit the treaty's 
provisions. The issue focused on an area of the coast called the Mrima coast. 
Said's position was that the Mrima coast had not been visited by foreign 
traders, there was no precedent for trade there, and that there was not even a 
custom master in the port. On January 12, 1843, the U.S. State Department 
finally responded to Said's letters and formally surrendered its trading rights 
on the Mrima coast. American merchants would be advised to abide by the 
Sultan's wishes in that area. 
The Sultan gave such great importance to this issue because he feared 
that direct trade on the coast by the Americans would encourage the British 
and French to demand the same right. Neither the British-Omani Treaty of 
1839 nor the Franco-Omani Treaty of 1844 provided this right of access to 
trading on the coast. Furthermore, such direct trade would, the Sultan 
feared, undermine his economic and political power on the coast.12 So when 
Charles Ward arrived to take up Waters' post, Sayyid Said renewed his 
campaign to amend Article II of the treaty, asking that Ward write a letter to 
his government requesting these changes. Further, he continued writing 
letters of his own to President Polk. However, the President failed to respond 
to Said's letters, and Ward also received no satisfactory responses. 
The Sultan then changed tactics. He appealed to the British Foreign 
Minister Palmerston, requesting that the British government support his 
dispute with the United States over Article II.13 Lord Palmerston 
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approached the Americans on behalf of Said, but the U.S. still refused to 
consider amendments to the treaty. However, in an effort to compromise, the 
U.S. acknowledged that it did not intend to press U.S. claims under Article II 
unduly. On June 15, 1848, Ward informed Said of the U.S. compromise, and 
Said accepted the American decision. The American government would not 
surrender its citizens' privileges granted under Article II, but at the same 
time it promised not to "open direct trade" on the coast.14 
One outcome of this dispute was the involvement of the British 
government in Omani-American relations. Ward wro_te a letter to Secretary of 
State Buchanan complaining of interference on the part of the British Consul 
Hamerton in the treaty dispute. It had been Hamerton who had advised 
Sayyid Said to appeal to the British government in his dispute with the U.S. 
over Article II of the treaty.15 
THE STATUS OF INDIAN NATIONALS 
The tenuous settlement of the controversy over the Treaty of 1833 did 
not end the string of controversies between Ward and Sayyid Said. Another 
troublesome issue was that of Indian nationality, which had erupted in the 
wake of the "Bankruptcy Case" that Ward inherited from Waters upon taking 
up the latter's post in Zanzibar. The case involved two Indian nationals who 
owed debts to two American firms. When Ward first attempted to discuss the 
issue with Sayyid Said, he wished to clarify for technical reasons whose 
subjects these Indians were. The Sultan informed Ward that they were his 
subjects, but that he would intercede to help secure the claims of the 
American firms owed money.16 The Sultan then ordered the liquidation of 
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the Indians' property. After fifteen months of negotiations, Ward succeeded in 
securing seventy percent of the debt owed the two American firms.17 
The Bankruptcy Case is important because it once more divided the 
Americans and British on either side of the Sultan, just as had the issue of 
the treaty amendment. It was the position ofHamerton and the British 
government that Indians, as citizens of a British colony, were in fact British 
subjects. However, in accordance with a treaty signed in 1822, the Indians 
were permitted to participate in the coast trade, as well as the slave trade, 
both of which were forbidden to the British as well as American merchants.18 
And this was the crux of the issue. If the Indians could be considered British 
subjects, Britain, by extension, would have a great trading advantage over 
the United States in the region. This is certainly part of the reason for Ward's 
siding with the Sultan against the British in the Bankruptcy Case. 
Ward and Hamerton continued to debate the status of Indian 
nationality. For some time the Sultan considered the Indians to be his 
subjects, but in time he came to recognize them as British subjects.19 He 
ultimately surrendered to Hamerton's and the British government's claims 
because the British were the dominant power in the Indian Ocean, and he 
needed their support and friendship to maintain his throne in the Gulf and 
East Africa. In explaining his decision to Ward, the Sultan told him that in 
the future whenever an Indian dealt with an American he would declare in 
writing his nationality (or allegiance, i.e., to Britain or Oman), and that this 
declaration would be binding. Ward had no choice but to accept the Sultan's 
decision, but he was unhappy with it. He wrote to the State Department that 
Hamerton's activities would destroy American interests in Zanzibar and East 
Africa and recommended that the United States government send a strong 
letter to Said. He also arranged for occasional visits to Zanzibar of U.S. 
warships. 20 
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The Indian nationality issue divided not just Ward and Said, but Ward 
and Hamerton as well. Ward fully believed that Hamerton's goal was to 
undermine America's position in the region and to actively harm relations 
between Oman and the United States. Whether or not Hamerton was the 
culprit, the result was that Omani-American relations never fully recovered 
under Ward's tenure as Consul at Zanzibar. 
THE FLAG DISPUTE AND WARD'S FINAL YEARS 
After the Indian nationality issue, disputes arose over even relatively 
trivial events. In 1850, Sayyid Said refused to fire a salute to the American 
flag on the Fourth of July, as was customary. Ward interpreted the Sultan's 
refusal as a direct insult to the American government and met with the 
Sultan to ask him why he'd refused the customary salute.21 The Sultan 
promised Ward that he'd provide the salute to the American flag, but reneged 
on the promise. When this happened, Ward again approached the Sultan and 
this time demanded a written apology and a twenty-one-gun salute. Said 
responded that the previous Consul, Waters, had always fired the first salute, 
and he insisted that the Americans must first fire their own salute. He 
refused to provide a written apology, but offered to refer the problem to the 
British and French Consuls. Ward refused the Sultan's offer and hauled down 
the American flag.22 
Soon after this Ward left Zanzibar for health reasons. He informed the 
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Sultan in a letter that he was leaving the country and that he had appointed 
his Vice-Consul, William McMullan, to act in his absence. As final acts, Ward 
informed Secretary of State Clayton of his departure from Zanzibar and 
instructed McMullan not to raise the flag in Zanzibar.23 Ward's tenure in 
Zanzibar ended on this trivial note. 
Upon returning to the United States, Ward once more wrote the 
Secretary of State about the flag dispute and recommended closing the 
American Consulate at Zanzibar. He felt that the Sultan had insulted the 
U.S. and that British Consul Hamerton was advising the Sultan in the 
dispute. He further advised that the U.S. should use force against Sayyid 
Said to secure American honor and respect. Because the Sultan saw only U.S. 
merchant vessels and not its warships, he could not appreciate the size and 
power of America. 24 
On Ward's advice the U.S. dispatched John Aulick aboard the U.S.S. 
Susg,uehannah to Zanzibar. His mission was to maintain American dignity 
and honor, although he was specifically instructed not to humiliate the 
Sultan or his people. The American warship arrived at Zanzibar on December 
2, 1851, with Aulick carrying a cordial letter to Said from President 
Fillmore.25 At this time, however, Sayyid Said was away from Zanzibar (he'd 
returned to Muscat) and had left his son, Khalid, in charge. 
Aulick called a meeting of American merchants in Zanzibar to discuss 
the flag dispute and their commercial position in Zanzibar. Although the 
American merchants had supported Ward in the flag dispute, they also 
believed Said was incapable of insulting the American flag or American 
honor, and they regarded the July 4th dispute as a misunderstanding. "His 
Highness considers us first among foreign merchants here and we have no 
desires for any greater favors than we have received," wrote one American 
merchant to Aulick regarding their special relationship.26 
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Aulick met with Khalid to discuss Omani-American relations in light of 
the July 4th incident. Khalid welcomed Aulick and assured him the incident 
would not damage the relationship between America and Oman. 
"We want what is best for both parties, and together we agree that the 
friendship between America and the Arab nations is an old friendship," 
Khalid told him. 27 The outcome of this successful meeting was that Khalid 
and Aulick agreed to settle the Flag dispute. Khalid would fire a salute to the 
American Flag and the Americans would return it. The dispute finally 
settled, the American Flag was once more raised in Zanzibar. Aulick and 
Khalid celebrated this victory of rapprochement with a state dinner, and, his 
mission completed, John Aulick departed Zanzibar with friendly relations 
restored. 28 
Despite this amicable settlement of the flag dispute, Ward's term in 
Zanzibar had been stormy and his several disputes with Sayyid Said had 
affected Omani-American relations greatly. Ward's policies could only lead to 
the Sultan's being alienated and driven away from the United States, and 
toward the British.29 
THE WILLIAM McMULLAN YEARS AND THE DEATH OF SAID, 
1852-1856 
It was in this strained diplomatic climate that in 1852 William 
McMullan took over as the third American Consul in Zanzibar. McMullan 
had resided in Zanzibar for some years as an agent of the trading firm of 
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Shepard and Bertram. His background, then, was in international trade. He 
was born on March 31, 1826, in Salem, and at 26 years old was the youngest 
Consul ever appointed to the position. McMullan served his youth in the 
Salem post office and spent some of his early years in East India. He had 
served as Vice Consul under Ward and as acting Consul during most of 
1851.30 His experience in Zanzibar trade as a result of these positions gained 
the respect of the local population. Sayyid Said was pleased to receive 
McMullan and hoped to continue friendly Omani-American relations. 
Despite the diplomatic reverses of the Ward years, the commercial 
activity of Americans in Zanzibar continued. In fact, American merchants 
were still the most prominent Western traders in the region. However, 
between 1845-1856 they faced increasing competition, both foreign and 
domestic. 
American trade in the region was led by two Salem firms, Pingree and 
West and Shepard and Bertram. These two had competed since Waters, who 
was an agent of of Pingree and West, assumed his position as Consul in 
Zanzibar. Upon leaving Zanzibar in 1850, Charles Ward became an agent for 
the firm of Shepard and Bertram, and gave that firm a similar inside 
advantage in the Zanzibar trade. These two Salem firms tried to corner their 
market and prevent other American firms from entering the Zanzibar trade. 
Despite their tactics, however, other firms from Boston and Providence, 
Rhode Island, entered the market and provided new competition. In 1852, 
Rufus Green and Company of Providence established an agent in Zanzibar 
and quickly became a powerful competitor.31 Healthy competition led to 
increases in the prices paid for goods, and consequently a reduction in profit. 
This forced merchants to extend their activities to Eastern African and 
Arabian ports. 32 This is precisely the development that Sayyid Said had 
feared when he sought an amendment to Article II of the Treaty of 1833. 
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However, the real threat to American dominance did not come from 
American competitors, but from the Europeans, whose commercial influence 
in the region expanded greatly throughout the 1840s and 1850s. In 1849, the 
influential Hamburg firm of Wilhelm O'swald and Company opened an 
agency in Zanzibar, and soon after the Germans became increasingly 
powerful in the Zanzibar market. 33 Not just the Germans, but also the 
French entered the Zanzibar market. In 1844, the French signed a treaty 
with the Sultan which expanded France's trade with Said's territories. In 
1849, Sayyid Said sent his own vessels to trade in Marseilles, and two years 
later, firms Vidal Bros. and Rabaud Bros, prominent Marseilles merchants, 
were established in Zanzibar. In 1854, another powerful Marseilles firm, 
Regis Bros., joined the Zanzibar trade.34 English merchants, on the other 
hand, although they traded in Zanzibar for many years, could not compete 
with America's superior goods. There were no British businesses established 
in Zanzibar, and the only Briton living there was the ConsuI.35 The British 
Consul's main objective was to establish political influence. 
American trade managed to meet the European challenge and hold on 
to its leading position in the Zanzibar trade. American cotton, in heavy 
demand in East Africa and Arabia, was of excellent, durable quality. The 
native name for this cotton cloth was "merikane," a word still used today. 
Omani-American relations continued throughout this period through 
both diplomatic and commercial channels. Diplomatically, McMullan's term 
---------1 
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was uneventful, to everyone's relief, and American merchants continued to 
compete with Europe throughout Zanzibar and East Africa. Unfortunately for 
the merchants, however, Said became more involved politically with his 
territories and was drawn increasingly closer to the British camp. 
For many years Said tried to remain free of British influence but, 
because he had to maintain his position in Oman and protect his territorial 
possessions, he was forced to deal with this most potent political and military 
power in the region. His position in Oman and East Africa was in jeopardy on 
two fronts: from the domestic conservative Ibadi unrest and, on the north, 
from the Wahabbi threat. Furthermore, the Persians were attacking Bandar 
Abbas, an area of Persia earlier annexed by Said. Consequently, Said's last 
years involved trying to keep the Ibadi conservatives within his rule, 
diminish the W ahabbi threat, and protect Bandar Abbas from invasion. 36 
Said succeeded in settling these problems but he continued to worry about 
French activities in East Africa; France had acquired the Cumoro Islands in 
1843. 
In the final years of his reign, Sayyid Said faced challenges which 
increased his dependence on Britain. Said's long life had become a struggle at 
the end. He became tired of the endless internal disputes and the constant 
threat from the Wahabbi. He tried throughout to maintain his independence, 
which is what induced him to court American commercial investment in his 
country, but his attempts to create a balance of outside influences was not 
entirely successful. Britain became so strong and powerful a force throughout 
the region, holding all of India and controlling the primary trade routes 
through the near and far east. In 1839 Britain occupied Aden, having signed 
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a general peace treaty with the rulers of the Trucial Coast in 1820.37 
In fact, the British clearly intended to take Said's territory after he 
died. Charles Ward asserts as much in a letter: "From what I have heard, and 
from the many conversations that I have had with the British consul, it 
appears to me that it is the policy of the British government to take 
possession of the East Coast of Africa at no distant day."38 Said's policies of 
balancing the commercial powers and interests in his territories with 
intelligent treaty forming helped to put off this British desire for his lands, 
however, and it would be some time before the British would have their way 
in East Africa. Despite Said's efforts, though, the British assumed a 
Protectorate over Zanzibar in 1890, and on March 20, 1891, Britain signed an 
agreement in which the Sultan of Oman agreed "never to cede, to sell, or to 
mortgage to any other governments [Omani territory] without the knowledge 
of the British government."39 
Ultimately, then, Said's reign was not to last. On September 15, 1856, 
Said left Muscat to return to Zanzibar. Before leaving he bid his mother good 
bye in the following terms: "Goodbye, Mother. I do not think we shall meet 
again in this world. I have a feeling this is my last voyage, so I am taking my 
death shroud with me so that death may not come on me unprepared."40 
Soon after departing Muscat, Said began to suffer pains in his legs and 
shortly after suffered an attack of dysentery. On October 19, 1856, Said died 
at the age of sixty-seven. Six days later, his ship arrived in Zanzibar to a 
crowd of people awaiting his arrival. 
On October 2, 1855, McMullan left Zanzibar and embarked on the ~ 
for Salem. He resigned as consul in 1856, the year of Said's death. McMullan 
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was succeeded by his vice consul, Daniel H. Mansfield. In November of 1856, 
Mansfield wrote to his government and informed them of Said's death, and 
included a letter from Majid to President Pierce in which he declared himself 
Sultan of Zanzibar and the East African possessions. President Pierce 
responded with a letter expressing his sincerest condolences.41 
Said's death ended an era marked by the establishment of a 
remarkable commercial empire. Thereafter, Oman and Zanzibar were divided 
between Said's two sons, Majid and Thuwainy. Majid declared himself Sultan 
of Zanzibar and East Africa, while Thuwainy claimed the right to succeed the 
sovereignty of his father in Oman and Zanzibar. Their dual claims to the 
rulership of Zanzibar created a serious crisis, and Thuwainy threatened to 
use force if necessary. Lord Canning, British Governor-General of India, 
intervened to settle the disputes between Said's sons, successfully dividing 
Said's Empire between Majid and Thuwainy. Majid was to rule Zanzibar and 
would make an annual payment of 40,000 Maria Theresa dollars to Oman. 
Thuwainy was given Oman. Unfortunately, the division of Said's Empire 
between his two sons resulted in the rapid decline of both Oman and 
Zanzibar.42 
Sayyid Said ruled Oman and Zanzibar for fifty years. He was the first 
ruler to encourage American trade and promote the economic development of 
Zanzibar and East Africa. Since his first visit to Zanzibar in 1828, and his 
first meeting with Edmond Robert, Omani-American commercial and 
diplomatic relations reached an impressive peak. American consuls and 
merchants, with the exception of Ward, praised him. He laid a solid 
foundation for future relations between the United States and the Gulf 
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region, opening the door to American relations with the region. 
CONCLUSION 
Omani-American commercial and diplomatic relations in the 
nineteenth century were the outgrowth of the personal and commercial 
interests of the two countries as promulgated by Sayyid Said and Edmund 
Roberts, who might be considered the father of the Omani-American Treaty of 
1833. Roberts, a merchant trader, opened for the American merchant fleet a 
long-standing and lucrative port of call in the Arabian Gulf, the first such 
port in the region. This first treaty between a Western power and one of the 
Gulf states also served as a model for subsequent treaties between the 
Sultanate of Oman and other European countries. Although certain political 
concerns may have formed a backdrop to these negotiations for some of the 
European countries (particularly the British), and although Sayyid Said had 
some desire to realize a military advantage out of his alignment with the 
U.S., the fact remains that the primary motivation on all parts for the 
opening of the ports of Oman to American, and subsequently European 
traders, was commercial development. 
Because some American merchant traders, particularly those sailing 
out of Salem, Massachusetts, were unable to compete very effectively with 
merchants out of Boston and New York in the Far East trade, they were 
interested in opening trade lines to Zanzibar as a lucrative alternative. 
America's first consul to Zanzibar, Richard P. Waters, was in fact from a 
Salem trading family, and in addition to serving as a representative in 
Zanzibar for the American Government, he was equally, if not more so, a 
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representative of Salem trading interests. He devoted his time in Zanzibar to 
these commercial interests, and also established for himself a lucrative 
arrangement in partnership with Zanzibar's master of the custom house, 
Jairam Sewji. Regardless of the extent to which Waters may have abused his 
official position in the furtherance of his own and Salem merchants' 
commercial interests, Waters' tenure as consul to Zanzibar was most 
productive for both countries' political and commercial goals. In Waters' 
defense, however, it might be said that his conduct and ethics were those of 
his times, during which consuls were not paid by the federal government, but 
were expected to support themselves by commercial activities conducted in 
conjunction with their consular duties. 
Omani-American relations expanded and prospered during Waters' 
tenure in Zanzibar. When he was succeeded by the second American Consul, 
Charles Ward, in 1846, the situation changed significantly. Although Ward, 
like Waters, was a New England merchant, his diplomatic skills were 
significantly weaker. His tenure as consul was marked by one dispute after 
another, and it culminated in the breaking off of diplomatic relations between 
America and Oman in 1850. The damaged relations were repaired in 1851 in 
a special mission headed by John Aulick, but the damage Ward succeeded in 
doing was in part irreversible. During Ward's tenure, the British took 
advantage of deteriorating American influence, even promoted it, and 
installed themselves as prominent competitors with the American merchants. 
Soon to follow were the French and Germans, all of them eventually signing 
commercial treaties on the model of the American treaty. 
Ward resigned his post in 1852 and was replaced by William 
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McMullan, the third American Consul to Zanzibar. McMullan, like his 
predecessors, also had strong ties to the Salem merchant traders, and under 
his tenure Omani-American commercial and political relations expanded and 
developed, despite the fact that the Salem hegemony that existed in the 
Waters years was over and never to be reclaimed. Zanzibar was a well 
developed port of call by this time, and the Salem merchants were forced to 
compete not just with the British and French, but with Boston and New York 
merchants as well. 
This was the period during which Omani-American relations matured. 
Sayyid Said welcomed the American presence for both political and 
commercial reasons. Unlike the British and French, the Americans did not 
meddle in the Sultan's internal affairs, as they had no significant vested 
political or military interests in the region. Said therefore enjoyed the 
American presence because it acted as a balance against the British and 
French. Focal in Said's struggle with the British was the latter's intervention 
to suppress the slave trade, which had been rife off the East African coast. 
Treaties dating back to 1822, and including treaties signed in 1839 and 1845, 
had been signed with the British to control the export of slaves from the 
Sultan's African to his Asian territories, and the pressure had forced Said to 
restructure his country's economic profile. The void left by suspension of the 
slave trade was conveniently filled by the growing American merchant trade. 
Western trade enabled Sayyid Said to increase his wealth and extend 
his political and economic control over the East African coast. Through the 
appointment of regional governors and customs agents he controlled the 
movement of goods from East Africa, and his caravans traded regularly with 
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the African interior. He also developed his own merchant fleet and his vessels 
sailed regularly to India, France, and Britain. His famous vessel Sultanah 
even visited New York in 1840 on a diplomatic mission, the first visit of an 
Arab vessel to the United States. 
The relationship between the United States and Sayyid Said was 
mutually beneficial. The interests of each complemented the other's. Both the 
Salem merchants and Sayyid Said prospered. The harmony of the 
relationship (disregarding the unfortunate years of Charles Ward) was due 
largely to the farsighted and competent leadership of Sayyid Said. When Said 
at last died, in 1856, the years of prosperity came to an end. A bitter battle for 
succession to Said's crown waged by his two sons, Majid and Thuwainy, 
resulted in the division of the Sultanate. Oman and Zanzibar were politically 
and economically divided, which led to the speedy decline of both. This 
division suited the political and military interests of the British, whose 
colonial empire straddled the Middle East, but it marked the end of an 
illustrious chapter in the history of the region. 
In April, 1983, Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al-Said of Oman visited 
Washington to meet with President Reagan to mark the 150th anniversary of 
the historic signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1833 between 
the United States and Oman. The event was a testimonial to Omani-
American relations, which are a model of the desire on the part of two peoples 
for mutual interest and respect, and was a memorial to the wisdom of the 
framers of the relationship, Edmund Roberts, Richard Waters, and 
particularly Sayyid Said. 
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